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ENRICHMENT SERIES
The Supreme Court and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: Has The
Burger Court Retreated?
PAUL MARCUS*
Introduction
In 1953, Earl Warren was named by President Dwight Eisenhower to become
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He served in this capacity
until his retirement in 1969. Immediately thereafter, President Richard Nixon
selected Judge Warren Burger to become the new Chief Justice. Earl Warren
served as Chief Justice for sixteen years. As of the writing of this article,
Chief Justice Burger has also been in his position for sixteen years. This arti-
cle will discuss Supreme Court rulings during this 32-year period, focusing
on the area of statements and confessions in criminal cases. The seminal deci-
sions of the 1960s will be analyzed and consideration will be given to deci-
sions by the Burger Court in the 1970s and 1980s. The key question will be
whether the rulings of the '60s have been followed, ignored, limited, or
distinguished in subsequent decisions.
The Beginnings
When Earl Warren was named to replace Fred Vincent as Chief Justice,
he inherited a Court that had been badly split for several years on numerous
questions. With the coming of Warren and other new Justices, however, the
membership of the Court expressed a willingness to consider and to decide
issues that had been avoided in earlier times. During Earl Warren's tenure
as Chief Justice, he presided over a Court made up of a large and diverse
group of individuals: Hugo Black (appointed in 1937, formerly a senator from
Alabama), William Brennan (1956, Second Circuit judge), Harold Burton
(1945, a senator from Ohio), Tom Clark (1949, Attorney General), William
0. Douglas (1939, Securities Exchange Commission), Abe Fortas (1965, senior
partner of a major Washington, D.C. law firm), Felix Frankfurter (1939,
Harvard professor of law), Arthur Goldberg (1962, Secretary of Labor), John
Harlan (1955, Second Circuit judge), Robert Jackson (1941, Solicitor General),
Thurgood Marshall (1967, NAACP and Second Circuit judge), Sherman Min-
ton (1949, a senator from Indiana), Stanley Reed (1938, Solicitor General),
Potter Stewart (1958, Sixth Circuit judge), Bryon White (1962, deputy Attorney
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona. A version of this paper was delivered
as part of an Enrichment Program lecture at the College of Law in October, 1985-Ed.
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General), Charles Whittaker (1957, Eighth Circuit judge). Remarkably, this
diverse group of individuals agreed to resolve issues that had divided the bar
and judiciary for most of the century. The 1960s showed a dramatic upsurge
in decisions in a host of constitutional law areas: civil rights,' first amend-
ment protections,2 legislative representation, 3 and others.'
While the upsurge in other areas of constitutional law may well have been
dramatic, it was nothing short of revolutionary in the area of constitutional
criminal considerations. Within a five-year period between 1962 and 1967 the
Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright,5 establishing the right to counsel at
trial in serious criminal cases; Griffin v. California,6 prohibiting the com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial; United States v. Wade,7
requiring a lawyer at post-indictment lineups; and Mapp v. Ohio,, creating
an exclusionary rule in state cases to vindicate violations of the fourth amend-
ment search and seizure provision. In no area, however, was the revolution
as powerful as in the area dealing with statements and confessions of criminal
defendants. Here the Court chose not simply to alter the traditional rules but
to set forth very specific procedures to be followed by law enforcement
officials. The Court chose, in Justice Harlan's words, to enact a "new con-
stitutional code of rules for confessions." 9
The Court reached this new code, however, only after struggling with the
tension between effective law enforcement and individual rights for most of
the twentieth century. Before the involvement of the Warren Court, the sole
test for determining the appropriate nature of the police conduct and the ad-
missibility of an individual's confession was a test of voluntariness.
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly
established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years:
the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essen-
tially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he
has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if
his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
..The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction
1. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), where the Court applied the equal
protection @lause to criminal appeals.
2. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (protected speech); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), both
dealing with "one man-one vote."
4. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel, welfare rights); Levy v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (rights regarding illegitimacy).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
7. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused,
propels or helps to propel the confession.10
This voluntariness test was, by necessity, a case-by-case approach. In each
case the courts would have to look to the actions of the police officer, the
individual characteristics of the defendant, as well as other surrounding cir-
cumstances, in determining whether the statement was a product of free will
or one of coercion. The United States Supreme Court found it difficult to
enunciate principles that lent themselves to clear precedential assistance.
However, in some cases the answers were so clear that little debate ensued,
even in the United States Supreme Court. For example, in Brown v. Missis-
sippi," the defendants refused to confess to a crime and were hanged by a
rope to the limb of a tree, whipped, beaten with a leather strap with buckles
on it, and were made "to understand that the whipping would be continued
unless and until they confessed."'I2 Even as late as 1967 similar cases reached
the Supreme Court, as in Beecher v. Alabama.' There the defendant was
captured after his escape from a road gang in the Alabama State Prison. The
police chief, in questioning the defendant, pressed a loaded gun to his face
while another officer pointed a rifle against the side of his head. After the
defendant refused to confess, the police chief advised him that if he did not
tell the truth he would be killed at that moment. The subsequent confession
was ruled inadmissible."
Cases such as Brown and Beecher were not difficult for the courts, as the
police officers' conduct in both cases was clearly overreaching and would have
bent the will of even the strongest of defendants. In other cases, however,
the result was far more questionable. The defendant in Crooker v. California
was repeatedly denied the assistance of counsel.'" Despite such denial, his con-
fession was ruled to be admissible, in part because he was a law student who
appeared to understand his rights. In Haynes v. Washington,'6 however, the
defendant's confession was not admitted after he too asked to talk with his
lawyer and was told he could not unless he "cooperated" with the police.
The dissenters in the Haynes case, decided just five years after Crooker, simply
could not understand how the two cases could be distinguished and why the
confession in Haynes was viewed to be involuntary and hence inadmissible.
The Warren Court Moves Toward Miranda
It became evident by the late 1950s that the case-by-case approach was an
unsatisfactory way of dealing with the problem of allegedly involuntary con-
10. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
11. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
12. Id. at 282.
13. 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
14. "A realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case compels the conclusion that this
petitioner's confessions were the product of gross coercion." Id. at 38.
15. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
16. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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fessions. The Supreme Court could not hear enough cases, and those cases
it did hear tended to be resolved on the particular facts involved in the con-
troversy. The state and lower federal courts were thus left in a quandary as
to the precedential value of particular cases. With the change in personnel
on the Court in the early 1960s, however, it was hoped that more guidance
would be given to judges in this troubling area. The early hope was that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would be the guiding force.
Indeed, in 1964 the Court held in Malloy v. Hogan that the self-incrimination
provision of the fifth amendment was made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.' 7 Immediately after Maloy, the
Court chose, in Escobedo v. Illinois, to step back from the self-incrimination
approach,' 8 looking instead to the sixth amendment right to counsel as a
precursor to Miranda.
Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to police headquarters for ques-
tioning. For a long period of time Escobedo's lawyer was present at the police
station demanding to see his client. Escobedo, knowing that the lawyer was
present, asked to see his attorney. All requests were refused, and Escobedo
ultimately confessed. The question for the Court was whether the confession
should be admissible.
Surprisingly, the Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois9 did not focus
on the fifth amendment provision incorporated in Malloy v. Hogan. Instead,
the Court looked to the sixth amendment right to counsel and discussed how
it would be "highly incongruous" if the confession could be extracted from
the accused "while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from
him by the police." For much of the opinion, Justice Goldberg spoke broadly
of the constitutional considerations involved in the case:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on
the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation. As Dean
Wigmore so wisely said: "[Any system of administration which
permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-
disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby.
The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and
to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other sources.
The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness
of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful pro-
cess of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and
to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an answer, there
soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,-that is, to a
17. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Escobedo was decided one week after Malloy v. Hogan.
19. Id.
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confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust
abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the en-
croachments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the course
of experience in those legal systems where the privilege was not
recognized." 2
Ultimately, however, the language of the Escobedo Court was either
extremely limiting in its holding, or downright confusing.
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute con-
stitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the
Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment," . . .and that no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.
We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory
to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose
is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate,
and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted
to consult with his lawyer. 2'
The juxtaposition of this narrow holding with the broad dicta created great
confusion immediately after the Escobedo decision. Some courts interpreted
Escobedo to hold that a constitutional violation occurred only if the suspect
specifically requested counsel.2" Other judges took a broader view and found
that interrogation could not occur unless the defendant had been effectively
informed of his right to a lawyer as well as his right to remain silent.23 Within
a two-year period, with confusion and inconsistencies mounting, the Supreme
Court decided to review its holding in Escobedo.
Miranda v. Arizona
Four cases were joined together for decision in Miranda v. Arizona."4 While
the facts in each differed somewhat, the cases shared two common and vital
points. In each "the defendants' statements [might not] have been involun-
20. Id. at 489 (emphasis by the Court).
21. Id. at 490-91, 492.
22. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Cummings, 49 Hawaii 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967).
23. See, e.g., State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487, 398 P.2d 482 (1965).
24. Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 98 Ariz.
1985]
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tary in traditional terms," 25 and in each the defendant was not warned of
the right to remain silent. While beginning the opinion with reference to the
sixth amendment right to counsel,26 the Court soon made clear that the linchpin
in this area was the fifth amendment principle that "no person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."",
Chief Justice Warren, for a five-Justice majority,28 discussed in detail com-
mon techniques for interrogation that were designed to obtain an admission
of guilt.2 9 Putting those techniques together with the unfriendly atmosphere
normally surrounding the interrogation of a suspect,"0 the majority concluded
that specific procedures would be required so as to apprise "accused persons
of their right of silence and . . . a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 3'
The Court first indicated that the rules applied only to individuals who were
in custody and subject to interrogation. In such cases, those individuals would
need to be informed in clear and unequivocable terms that they had the right
to remain silent, that anything said could and would be used against the in-
dividual in court, that the defendant had a right to have an attorney present
during interrogation, and that the state would provide indigent defendants
with attorneys if they so wished.
32
The opinion in Miranda produced a firestorm of protest. Justice Harlan,
dissenting, stated that he refused to subscribe "to the generally black picture
of police conduct painted by the Court, 133 and instead he urged the Court
to retain the system of voluntariness, which had been the exclusive remedy
up until that time. Apart from his theoretical criticism of the Chief Justice's
opinion, he was quite concerned that "the Court's new code would markedly
decrease the number of confessions.
34
Despite the criticism, the Court moved forward. In a series of cases decided
soon after Miranda, the Justices continued to reaffirm the holding there and
indeed expanded it. An analysis of this expansion can best be explored by
a comparison of the approach of the Warren Court to that of the Burger Court.
Two Very Different Courts Take Two Different
Views of Miranda
Warnings
Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case was very specific as to the law
18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965); California v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P.2d 97, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1965); Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E.2d 527, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1965).
25. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
26. Id. at 442.
27. One of the "basic rights . . . enshrined in our Constitution." Id.
28. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the majority opinion.
29. He looked to "various police manuals and texts," a "valuable source of information
about present police practices." Id. at 448.
30. These are such techniques as interrogators offering seemingly legal excuses for the crime,
portraying a two-person "friendly-unfriendly" act ("Mutt and Jeff" routine). Id. at 451-52.
31. Id. at 444.
32. Id. at 479.
33. Id. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 516.
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enforcement obligations in giving warnings. He spelled out in detail the precise
message to be given to the suspect in custody.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must
be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the
system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the
warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can
be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute pre-
requisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence
that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to
stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable
assurance that the accused was aware of this right.35
In referring to these "safeguards," he pointed out that no other procedure
would be acceptable unless the Court was shown that such other methods
were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 6
While numerous state and lower court decisions pondered the precise wording
of the warnings after Miranda, no case directly raised the issue in the Supreme
Court until California v. Prysock.3" The defendant there, a juvenile, was ad-
vised by law enforcement officers that he had "the right to talk to a lawyer
before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being
questioned, and all during the questioning," and further informed him that
he had "the right to have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost
to yourself." 38 The California Court of Appeals ruled that the confession
could not be admissible because he had not been "explicitly informed of his
right to have an attorney appointed before further questioning."39 The United
States Supreme Court disagreed. It held that no rigid adherence to the precise
words of Miranda was needed so long as the defendant essentially received
the warnings concerning silence and counsel."0 Holding that the officer's ac-
tions in Prysock had done just that, the Court refused to find a constitu-
tional violation.
4 '
35. Id. at 471-72.
36. Id. at 467.
37. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
38. Id. at 357.
39. Id. at 358-59.
40. Id.
This Court has never indicated that the "rigidity" of Miranda extends to the precise
formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant. This Court and others
have stressed as one virtue of Miranda the fact that the giving of the warning obviates
the need for a case-by-case inquiry into the actual voluntariness of the admissions
of the accused. Nothing in these observations suggests any desirable rigidity in the
form of the required warnings. Id.
41. Justice Stevens, in dissent, found the warnings to be ambiguous. He emphasized the re-
quirement "that an accused be adequately informed of his right to have counsel appointed prior
to any police questioning." Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19851
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Custody
Soon after the Warren Court's decision in Miranda, it was forced to con-
sider several cases involving the question of custody. For example, in Mathis
v. United States,4" the defendant had been placed in jail for an entirely separate
offense. Police officers questioned him about an unrelated tax investigation.
The Court nonetheless found that Miranda still applied, for the defendant
had been "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in [a] significant way." '
Similarly, in Orozco v. Texas," decided just one year later, the Court con-
cluded that custody could be found even when the defendant had been arrested
in his own residence. The police there were admitted to the defendant's
bedroom at a boardinghouse. Because the defendant was not free to go at
that time, the majority found that he was in custody even though he was
not in the "isolated setting of the police station. '
The Burger Court has taken a far more restrictive view of custody. In several
key cases the Court has narrowly construed the Miranda holding with respect
to the significant deprivation of freedom. Two in particular are noteworthy.
46
The first is Oregon v. Mathiason,1 where the defendant, on parole at the
time of his interrogation, was suspected by police officers of committing a
theft. An officer asked the defendant to come to the station house and while
there the defendant confessed in response to interrogation. The Supreme Court
of Oregon found that Miranda required suppression of the statement because
no warnings had been given.
We hold the interrogation took place in a "coercive environ-
ment." The parties were in the offices of the State Police; they
were alone behind closed doors; the officer informed the defend-
ant he was a suspect in a theft and the authorities had evidence
incriminating him in the crime; and the defendant was a parolee
under supervision. We are of the opinion that this evidence is not
overcome by the evidence that the defendant came to the office
in response to a request and was told he was not under arrest."
The majority of the Court, in a per curiam decision, found that while Mathis
and Orozco were still good law, there was no indication "that the question-
ing took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted
42. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. Id. at 5.
44. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
45. Id. at 326. The dissenters (Justices White and Stewart) did not believe that Miranda applied
in the familiar surroundings involved in Orozco. "The Court wholly ignores the question whether
similar hazards exist or even are possible when police arrest and interrogate on the spot, whether
it be on the street corner or in the home, as in this case." Id. at 329 (White, J., dissenting).
46. There are others. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), where the
Court refused to apply Miranda to an IRS investigation conducted at a private home.
47. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
48. Id. at 494 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 275 Or. 1, 5, 549 P.2d 673, 675 (1976)).
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in any way." 4 9 Thus, the majority focused not on the hostile environment
of the setting (stressed repeatedly by the Chief Justice in Miranda°) but in-
stead on the defendant's ability to come or go as he pleased. With such em-
phasis, the Court was able to define custody narrowly so as to exclude the
facts in the instant case.'
An even more significant decision was reached more recently in Berkermer
v. McCarty.12 There the defendant was stopped for a routine traffic viola-
tion. The defendant argued that he was in custody when he was pulled to
the side of the road by the police officers, as his freedom of movement had
been significantly limited by such law enforcement conduct. The Court, in
an opinion by Justice Marshall, disagreed, focusing on the routine nature of
a traffic stop.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that
a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely." First, detention of a motorist pur-
suant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The
vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period
of time answering questions ... but that in the end he most likely
will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from station-
house interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which
the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop
are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of
the police. 3
While the decision in Berkermer v. McCarty makes a good deal of sense,
relating as it does to the most commonplace, routine sorts of traffic stops,
Mathiason is not nearly so easily justified. There the defendant, a parolee,
was brought to the hostile environment of a station house and was intensively
interrogated before he confessed. It is true that he was not "formally under
arrest"; it is nevertheless also true that the pressures brought -to bear by the
Oregon police were not significantly different from the pressures brought to
bear by the Arizona police in Miranda v. Arizona. Hence, the inescapable
49. 429 U.S. at 495.
50. And by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Mathiason: "[I1f respondent entertained objec-
tively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave during questioning, then he was 'deprived
of his freedom of action in a significant way'." Id. at 496.
51. See supra text accompanying note 49.
52. 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
53. Id. at 3149-50.
1985]
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conclusion is reached that the Court in Mathiason was trying to limit the
holding of Miranda with respect to the concept of custody."4
Interrogation
Chief Justice Warren spent little time in Miranda discussing the meaning
of the term "interrogation." In most cases it is clear that the suspect has
been interrogated. The only material language on point in Miranda was suc-
cinct. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."" The Burger Court,
however, hits spoken extensively on the concept of interrogation and in two
cases reached what appear to be quite different results on the meaning of
interrogation. The first is Brewer v. Williams.5 The defendant in that case
was being transported from one city in Iowa to another after an agreement
had been reached (between the lawyer and the police) that he would not be
interrogated by the escorting police officers. 7 During the course of travel,
on a wintry day in the countryside, one of the police officers, addressing the
defendant as "reverend," made the "now famous 'Christian burial speech'."'"
This speech became the focal point of the Court's opinion in the case.
"I want to give you something to think about while we're travel-
ing down the road. . . .Number one, I want you to observe the
weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving
is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early
this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight,
and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where
this little girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once,
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable
to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the
way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body,
that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian
burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and
locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and try-
ing to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being
able to find it at all." 5
9
Justice Stewart, for a majority of the Court, found that this speech was
indeed interrogation for the officer "purposely sought during Williams' isola-
54. Mathiason was recently reaffirmed in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
55. 384 U.S. at 444.
56. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Ultimately, the case was resolved on sixth amendment waiver grounds.
The question of interrogation under both amendments is identical, however. See, e.g., United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), involving jailhouse interrogation after indictment.
57. 430 U.S. at 391-92.
58. As referred to by the lawyers and the Court. Id. at 392.
59. Id. at 392-93.
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tion from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as possi-
ble.""0 Several members of the Court dissented from the holding, finding that
there was no interrogation. 6' In particular, however, Chief Justice Burger
strongly disputed the Court's conclusion. He noted that the defendant had
been "prompted by the detective's statement-not interrogation but a state-
ment." 2 Just three years later the Chief Justice's narrow view of the concept
of interrogation was to prevail in Rhode Island v. Inni.
63
Justice Stewart also wrote the opinion in Innis. There, however, the facts
were somewhat different, for the statement of one officer was directed to
another officer, rather than to the defendant. Innis had been picked up late
one evening in connection with a murder charge. While en route to the sta-
tion house one of the officers initiated a conversation with another officer
concerning a missing shotgun. Innis was in the back seat of the squad car
at this time and heard the entire conversation. The essence of the conversa-
tion was that one officer thought it would be tragic if a child at the nearby
school for handicapped children were to find the shotgun that had been used
and hidden by the suspect. In apparent response to this statement, the defen-
dant interrupted the conversation and showed the officers where the gun had
been located. Justice Stewart conceded that interrogation, as defined in
Miranda, was not to apply only "to those police interrogation practices that
involve express questioning of a defendant while in custody."6 Rather, other
techniques of persuasion, wholly apart from express questioning, could amount
to interrogation. 65 The issue was whether the "words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) [were
such] that the police should know [they] are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect. ' 66 Finding that the statements of the
officers were not reasonably designed to elicit a response, the majority de-
cided that there was no interrogation.
It is difficult to understand the holdings as applied to the facts in the cases.
The standards used in both cases seem similar. Were the actions of the officers
truly, and reasonably, designed to receive incriminating information from the
suspect? In Brewer v. Williams, the entire point of the "Christian burial
speech" was clearly to prompt the suspect to incriminate himself. In Innis
60. Id. at 399.
61. Justice Blackmun noted that "[p]ersons in custody frequently volunteer statements in
response to stimuli other than interrogation." Id. at 440 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
62. For him, the "result in this case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports
to call itself an organized society." Id. at 415 (Burger, J., dissenting). Williams was retried and
convicted and his conviction was ultimately affirmed. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
63. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
64. Id. at 298.
65. Id. at 299. "The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the 'interrogation environ-
ment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the individual to
the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination." Id.
66. Id. at 301.
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it is a closer question. Still, it is hard to justify the Court's conclusion. As
Justice Marshall noted in dissent, the purpose of the conversation between
the officers appeared to be to retrieve the shotgun and hence to record in-
criminating statements by the suspect.6
7
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience
of a suspect-any suspect-than the assertion that if the weapon
is not found an innocent person will be hurt or killed. And not
just any innocent person, but an innocent child-a little girl-a
helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion
that such an appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless
the suspect were known to have some special interest in handicapped
children verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal
to a suspect to confess for the sake of others, to "display some
evidence of decency and honor," is a classic interrogation tech-
nique.61
Justice Marshall's conclusion is correct. Why engage in this conversation?
Moreover, the conversation "must have begun almost immediately" after the
arrest because the car traveled no more than a mile before Innis agreed to
point out the location of the murder weapon. The test in both cases appears
to be a faithful construction of Miranda focusing on the technique used as
opposed to the presence of express questioning. In Brewer v. Williams the
test is applied correctly; in Innis it is not.
Resumption of Questioning
The defendant is taken into custody, given the appropriate warnings and
then asked questions by police officers. He then says that he does not wish
to talk, either because he simply wants to remain silent, or because he wants
to confer with a lawyer. Can the officers ask him additional questions after
he has first declined to talk with them?
The lower courts had considerable difficulty with the question of the officers
resuming the interrogation and split along various lines.' 9 It was not until
1975 that the United States Supreme Court chose to grapple with the issue
directly. In Michigan v. Mosely the defendant was arrested in connection with
several robberies.70 The arresting officer advised Mosely of his Miranda rights
and then began questioning him. At that point Mosely said he did not want
to answer any questions about the robbery; the interrogation ceased. Some
*hours later a police detective questioned Mosely about a murder, a crime for
which Mosely had not been arrested nor interrogated. Once again Mosely
67. Id. at 306-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 306.
69. See, e.g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (no per se rule even with
demand for a lawyer); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976) (demand for
a lawyer); People v. Stander, 73 Mich. App. 617, 251 N.W.2d 258 (1977) (reinterrogation on
the same offense).
70. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
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received his Miranda warnings. In response to this second round of question-
ing, Mosely made incriminating statements. The question, therefore, was
whether Miranda prohibited the second attempt at interrogation?
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product
of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked.
7'
Justice Brennan, in dissent, thought that the "second round" was improper.
He argued that the police officers had not "scrupulously honored" the defen-
dant's exercise of his "right to cut off questioning." ' 72 The majority, however,
disagreed. Justice Stewart found that Mosely had a right to cut off question-
ing and did so. It was only after a break in time,73 the provision of a fresh
set of warnings, and interrogation on an unrelated offense that Mosely freely
confessed.
In many ways the decision in Mosely is strikingly reminiscent of the holding
in Escobedo. While the language here was also broad, the ultimate holding
was quite narrow. This was a situation in which there was no repeated im-
mediate questioning; it was not about the same crime; and the defendant had
received a fresh set of warnings before the second interrogation. Even more
important, however, Mosely had merely chosen to remain silent; he had not
asked for counsel.
The defendant in Edwards v. Arizona did ask for a lawyer after he was
arrested.7" He specifically stated, "I want an attorney before making a deal."
At that point questioning ceased and he was taken to jail. The next morning
the officers gave him his Miranda warnings again and informed him that he
"had" to talk with them. He thereafter made an incriminating statement.
The Court in Edwards went back to the language of Miranda and had little
difficulty in concluding that the statement by the defendant had to be sup-
pressed. The Court noted that the Chief Justice's opinion in Miranda
distinguished between the two requests made by the suspect. "If the accused
indicates that he wishes to remain silent 'the interrogation must cease'....
If he requests counsel, 'the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present'.""'
71. Id. at 100-01 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74).
72. Id. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Justice White argued in his concurrence that the time factor was simply one considera-
tion in determining if the defendant's statement was voluntary. Id. at 110-11.
74. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
75. Id. at 482 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474).
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No doubt the decision in Edwards is correct. The officers ought not to
be able to reinterrogate on the same offense or an unrelated offense when
the defendant has made clear that he wishes to remain silent until his attorney
is present. What is surprising about the two cases is the ease with which the
Court in Edwards distinguishes the two fact patterns. That is, it is not clear
why the statement is not suppressed in both cases. If the defendant has in-
dicated he wishes to remain silent, Miranda states that "the interrogation must
cease." It must cease, presumably, because the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination requires that the police scrupulously honor the defen-
dant's exercise of that right. Whether the reinterrogation of the defendant
hours later is scrupulously honoring his right is open to severe question.
Waiver
The waiver problem in the Miranda context arises with great regularity.
The defendant is given the Miranda warnings, acknowledges that he receives
them, and then he makes an incriminating statement. The question is whether
that incriminating statement was made after a knowing and voluntary relin-
quishment of rights. The Warren Court had little occasion to consider the
question in connection with the statements made by the defendant. Once again
anticipating a problem, the Court noted that if the defendant speaks without
consulting an attorney, "a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." ' 6
The Burger Court, on the other hand, has had many occasions to deal
with the concept of waiver in this context. One of its strongest statements
is found in Tague v. Louisiana.77 The testifying officer there indicated that
he had read the defendant his rights and that he was not sure what the peti-
tioner's response was to those rights, other than to make an incriminating
statement. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that it could "be presumed
that a person has capacity to understand, and the burden is on the one claim-
ing a lack of capacity to show that lack." 78 The United States Supreme Court
had little difficulty reversing that decision, finding, in a summary proceeding,
that the proof obligation is on the government rather than the defendant:
"The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the pro-
secution's burden is great.""
North Carolina v. Butler raised the question of whether a statement under
Miranda would be admissible unless the defendant "explicitly waived the right
to the presence of a lawyer." 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court had held
that an express statement would be required to constitute a waiver. Justice
Stewart concluded that an express statement could be sufficient to constitute
76. 384 U.S. at 475.
77. 444 U.S. 469 (1980).
78. Id. at 470 (quoting State v. Tague, 372 So. 2d 555, 557-58).
79. Id. at 471.
80. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
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a waiver, but it was not necessary. Once again the Court looked back to the
language of Miranda, which did not appear to require any explicit action of
the defendant.
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to
remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of
the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary
or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form,
but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily
waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was une-
quivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does
not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled with an understand-
ing of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may
never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights.
The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights;
the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver
can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated. 8'
While an express waiver requirement would certainly be helpful to lawyers
in this area,8" the real question is the state of mind of the defendant. Thus,
under traditional waiver law, the question must be determined on "the par-
ticular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused."
8 3
The most troubling decision by the Burger Court in applying the waiver
rules under Miranda arose in a nontraditional waiver setting. The defendant
in Oregon v. Elstad" confessed in response to custodial interrogation without
having received Miranda warnings. Thereafter, he was given the warnings and
he gave a second, more detailed confession. The first confession was clearly
inadmissible under Miranda. The issue, thus, was whether the second confes-
sion was also inadmissible. Utilizing a "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis,
a number of judges and commentators had concluded that the second confes-
sion was "tainted" by the first confession.8" That is, because the defendant
81. Id. at 373.
82. Indeed, Justice Brennan in dissent argued that the facts in Butler present "a clear exam-
ple of the need for an express waiver requirement." Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 374-75, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Court also con-
sidered the waiver question in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). There the juvenile on
probation asked to see his probation officer. He did not state that he wished to remain silent
or wanted to see his attorney. California courts held that his request constituted an invocation
of the minor's fifth amendment rights. The Supreme Court once again looked to a case-by-case
determination of knowing and voluntary waiver and found that the request for the probation
officer was not, per se, an invocation of rights. The majority decided that the defendant was
of adequate intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving and the consequences of that
waiver when he spoke.
84. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
85. The seminal "fruit of the poisonous tree" decision is Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963). The Court there concluded that if there was an initial governmental illegality,
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was in custody at the time both statements were made, and because he was
not advised that the first confession would be inadmissible, it was that first
illegality (questioning without Miranda warnings) which directly led to the
second confession.
Justice O'Connor refused to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis
to the problem. She instead focused on the question of waiver.
The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was
also voluntarily made. As in any such inquiry, the finder of fact
must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course
of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the volun-
tariness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak
after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative. 6
It is hard to justify the result in Elstad for at least two reasons, If one
of the bases for the Miranda decision was to encourage proper and effective
law enforcement, admitting the statement in Elstad tends to defeat that pur-
pose. That is, this was not a case in which the officers were unaware of the
holding in Miranda before interrogating the suspect. Indeed, almost immediate-
ly after receiving the first confession without warnings, the officers gave the
Miranda warnings. Thus, admitting the statement can only encourage what
appears to be, at minimum, sloppy police interrogation. The second reason
relates to the concept of "fruit of the poisonous tree." The rationale for this
doctrine is that police officers ought not to benefit from illegality either in
connection with evidence immediately obtained (the first confession) or evidence
thereafter obtained (the second confession). While certainly not all subsequent
evidence should be excluded, the Court has been careful to make narrow ex-
ceptions to this doctrine. Thus, if the evidence would inevitably have been
discovered,8 7 or if the illegality led to a third party who voluntarily made
a statement, 8 such evidence is admitted. In the instant case, however, the
officers knowingly violated the defendant's rights. While the defendant was-
still in custody they interrogated him. It is difficult to understand why this
second confession is not, truly, the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Impeachment
Courts have been plagued for many years with questions concerning evidence
offered for the limited purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, as
opposed to being used by the trier of fact to find civil liability or criminal
guilt. For example, in some jurisdictions prior inconsistent statements, even
later evidence found as a result of that act should normally not be admissible at trial. The ques-
tion is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Id. at 488.
86. 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
87. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
88. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
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those made under oath, can only be used to attack the current statement by
the witness at trial, as opposed to being utilized as proof on the particular
point.8 9 Also, evidence that ran afoul of the fourth amendment could be used
in limited situations to discredit the statement of a witness at trial even though
they could not be offered to prove guilt because of the manner in which the
evidence had been obtained. 9°
It was not until Harris v. New York" that the impeachment question arose
in the context of a statement received in violation of Miranda being used to
impeach the in-court statement of the defendant. Once again, the Warren
Court did not have occasion to deal specifically with such a case, though it
appeared that its members had anticipated the problem by making reference
to it in the Miranda decision.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner ...
[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial. . . .These
statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word
and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver
required for any other statement.'2
In Harris the defendant was convicted of selling heroin to an undercover
police officer. At trial he took the stand in his own defense, acknowledging
making the sale but claiming that the substance was baking powder and part
of a scheme to defraud. On cross-examination the government's lawyer asked
the defendant whether he had made specific statements to the police follow-
ing his arrest that contradicted the testimony at trial. The trial judge instructed
the jury that the earlier statements referred to could only be considered in
passing on the witness' current credibility, but could not be used by the jury
as evidence of guilt in connection with the charged crime. 93 The government
conceded that the statements could not be used in the case in chief because
they were inadmissible under Miranda, but argued that the statements could
be used to impeach.
Chief Justice Burger stressed that the defendant ought not to be able to
take the stand and lie with impunity. "Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and
the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process."' 9 The Chief Justice went on to point out
that while the evidence excluded under Miranda could not be used in the case
89. The rules as to the force to be given to prior inconsistent statements differ greatly. See
4 J. WEINSTEIN, NVEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801-82 to 801-134 (1985) for a discussion of Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l).
90. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
91. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77.
93. Harris, 401 U.S. at 223.
94. Id. at 225.
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to prove the guilt or innocence of the defendant, it would be wrong to exclude
the evidence entirely when the defendant has taken the stand. "The shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by
way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately
impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.""9
As in Elstad, the Burger Court either misconstrued the rationale for Miranda
or purposely chose to limit the holding. That is, the Court in Harris focused
exclusively on the defendant's taking the stand and lying. It ignored one of
the chief bases of Miranda, which was to encourage proper and effective law
enforcement. If law enforcement officials believe that there is a chance that
a confession can be admitted for at least some purposes, even if they have
chosen not to adhere to the rules of Miranda, they will certainly not be
discouraged entirely from improper behavior. 6 Moreover, as has been pointed
out on innumerable occasions, there are serious questions as to whether the
jury can indeed understand the distinction between using evidence purely to
discredit the current testimony and using it to prove the guilt or innocence
of the defendant. 9"
Application of the Fifth Amendment
In the years after Miranda was decided, the dissenting Justices complained
bitterly about the application of Miranda and expressed great fears as to its
impact on effective law enforcement.98 When Warren Burger assumed the posi-
tion of Chief Justice, he and the other new appointments to the Court generally
subscribed to this harsh criticism. 9 In recent years, however, the criticism
has abated considerably and indeed the Court has chosen to expand the holding
of Miranda in a few significant areas.
The first area of expansion was one that was left open in Miranda or that
95. Id. at 226.
96. This was the position taken by dissenting Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall:
Thus, even to the extent that Miranda was aimed at deterring police practices in disregard
of the Constitution, I fear that today's holding will seriously undermine the achievement
of that objective. The Court today tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused
incommunicado and without counsel and know that although any statement they obtain
in violation of Miranda cannot be used on the State's direct case, it may be introduced
if the defendant has the temerity to testify in his own defense. This goes far toward undoing
much of the progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitution.
Id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. In the words of Learned Hand, such an exercise is "a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only [the jury's] power, but anybody else's." See the discussion in People v. Disbrow, 16
Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
98. See generally the dissents in Orozco, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), Mathis, 391 U.S. 1 (1968),
and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
99. Beginning in 1971, only five new Justices have joined the Court: Harry Blackmun (appointed
in 1970, former judge of the Eighth Circuit); Lewis Powell (1972, president of the ABA, private
practitioner from Virginia); Sandra Day O'Connor (1981, Arizona appeals judge); William Rehn-
quist (1972, Assistant Attorney General); and John Paul Stevens (1975, Seventh Circuit).
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at least was not specifically addressed. The question was whether Miranda
applied to all criminal cases, or only to serious ones. Some lower federal courts
assumed that the Court in Miranda did not mean to apply the fifth amend-
ment rule to even the most minor infractions and narrowly construed the
holding. The United States Supreme Court, however, concluded that the chief
point in Miranda was that the fifth amendment applies whenever the defen-
dant is in custody and is being interrogated, for whatever the crime. Hence,
even if the defendant was in custody for a relatively minor offense, Miranda
would apply. 00
Further expansion of Miranda also occurred in a case in which Chief Justice
Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. In Estelle v. Smith the Court deter-
mined that the government could not use psychiatric testimony as to the defen-
dant's statements at the sentencing phase of the defendant's capital murder
trial to establish his future dangerousness.' 0 ' The government had argued that
Miranda ought to be limited to traditional interrogation by law enforcement
officials. The Chief Justice disagreed, being unwilling to distinguish between
the guilt and the penalty phases of a capital murder trial and between the
interrogation given by police officers and the conversations of the defendant
with the psychiatrist.
Dr. Grigson's prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, reciting the
details of the crime. The Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore,
is directly involved here because the State used as evidence against
respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial
psychiatric examination.'
The major recent limitation on the rule in Miranda occurred in the case
that has become generally referred to as the "public safety exception" case,
New York v. Quarles.' The defendant was convicted of rape. He had been
cornered in a supermarket by police and was immediately asked where his
gun was. The suspect gave an incriminating answer to the question. No
Miranda warnings were given. Under a literal analysis of Miranda, the state-
ment could not be admissible because the defendant had been interrogated
and was clearly in custody during that interrogation. Justice Rehnquist, for
a majority of the Court, however, found that Miranda could not apply to
the situation in which the interrogation was not aimed at receiving a state-
ment, but rather at protecting the public. "In the case at bar there was fear
that the gun could be located by a child during the course of investigation."
We conclude that the need-for answers to questions in a situa-
tion posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for
the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege
100. Berkemer v. McCarty, 464 U.S. -1038 (1984).
101. 451 U.S. at 454 (1981).
102. Id. at 464-65.
103. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
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against self-incrimination. We decline to place officers ... in the
untenable position of having to consider, often in a matter of
seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary
questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever pro-
bative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the
warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they
might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to ob-
tain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting
them.'I4
While police officers ought to be able to ask a suspect where his weapon
is so that a public safety problem does not arise, the conclusion that the defen-
dant's response ought to be admissible is unsound. Miranda was aimed at
interrogation that could force a defendant to involuntarily give up fifth amend-
ment rights concerning self-incrimination. Clearly, being cornered in a store
by armed and uniformed police officers creates a very real risk that without
warnings the defendant cannot voluntarily relinquish his rights. Once again,
that does not mean the police officers cannot ask the question, receive the
answer, and locate the weapon. It simply means that the defendant's own
statement could not be used to convict.' 0
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona was truly
a landmark decision. For the first time the Court articulated with clarity the
principles behind the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the procedures that would need to be followed by law enforcement officials
in interrogating suspects. In the years immediately following Miranda the Court
expanded its holding to include areas perhaps not fully anticipated in its original
decision. With virtually a complete turnover in personnel on the Supreme
Court, however, there was great fear that Miranda would be overruled or
so severely limited that it would have little effective place in modern law
enforcement.
The fears of drastic change were ill-founded. The Burger Court has cer-
tainly narrowed the holding of Miranda in some important areas, such as
the resumption of questioning, the impeachment of the defendant, the use
of statements in connection with public safety problems, and the application
of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Nevertheless, it has not over-
ruled Miranda and has, indeed, expanded it in several important areas, such
104. Id. at 2633.
105. The policies underlying the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination are
not diminished simply because testimony is compelled to protect the public's safety. The
majority should not be permitted to elude the Amendment's absolute prohibition simply
by calculating special costs that arise when the public's safety is at issue. Indeed, were con-
stitutiona adjudication always conducted in such an ad hoc manner, the Bill of Rights would
be a most unreliable protector of individual liberties
104 S. Ct. at 2649 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Vol. 38:719
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss4/12
ENRICHMENT SERIES
as the resumption of questioning involving the request for counsel, the
application of Miranda to nontraditional criminal interrogations, and the use
of Miranda in all criminal cases. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger, himself a vehe-
ment critic of Miranda, has concluded that the decision should not be changed.
"The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda,
disparage it, nor extend it at this late date."'0 6
Miranda was a landmark decision when decided. In today's world it has
been a powerful influence that has helped to professionalize law enforcement
agencies. The Burger Court has made some inroads in limiting the holding
and application of Miranda. In some areas, though, the opinion has been
strengthened and even broadened. Miranda remains a vital and important
ruling today.
106. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (concurring opinion).
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